Kodakização (Portuguese Edition)

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George Fisher, who served as Kodak's boss from until , decided that its expertise lay not in chemicals but in imaging.

He cranked out digital cameras and offered customers the ability to post and share pictures online. A brilliant boss might have turned this idea into something like Facebook, but Mr Fisher was not that boss. He failed to outsource much production, which might have made Kodak more nimble and creative. Kodak sold cheap cameras and relied on customers buying lots of expensive film. Just as Gillette makes money on the blades, not the razors.

That model obviously does not work with digital cameras. Still, Kodak did eventually build a hefty business out of digital cameras—but it lasted only a few years before camera phones scuppered it. Kodak also failed to read emerging markets correctly. It hoped that the new Chinese middle class would buy lots of film. They did for a short while, but then decided that digital cameras were cooler. Many leap-frogged from no camera straight to a digital one.

Kodak's leadership has been inconsistent. Its strategy changed with each of several new chief executives. The latest, Antonio Perez, who took charge in , has focused on turning the firm into a powerhouse of digital printing something he learnt about at his old firm, Hewlett-Packard, and which Kodak still insists will save it. He has also tried to make money from the firm's huge portfolio of intellectual property—hence the lawsuit against Apple. At Fujifilm, too, technological change sparked an internal power struggle.

At first the men in the consumer-film business, who refused to see the looming crisis, prevailed. Named boss incrementally between and , he quickly set about overhauling the firm. He slashed costs and jobs. So we had to reconstruct the business model. This sort of pre-emptive action, even softened with generous payouts, is hardly typical of corporate Japan. Few Japanese managers are prepared to act fast, make big cuts and go on a big acquisition spree, observes Kenichi Ohmae, the father of Japanese management consulting.

For Mr Komori, it meant unwinding the work of his predecessor, who had handpicked him for the job—a big taboo in Japan. Still, Mr Ohmae reckons that Japan Inc's long-term culture, which involves little shareholder pressure for short-term performance and tolerates huge cash holdings, made it easier for Fujifilm to pursue Mr Komori's vision. American shareholders might not have been so patient.

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Surprisingly, Kodak acted like a stereotypical change-resistant Japanese firm, while Fujifilm acted like a flexible American one. Yet he hints that Kodak was complacent, even when its troubles were obvious. The firm was so confident about its marketing and brand that it tried to take the easy way out, says Mr Komori.

In the s it tried to buy ready-made businesses, instead of taking the time and expense to develop technologies in-house. Perhaps the challenge was simply too great. Kodak's blunder was not like the time when Digital Equipment Corporation, an American computer-maker, failed to spot the significance of personal computers because its managers were dozing in their comfy chairs.

Dominant firms in other industries have been killed by smaller shocks, he points out. Of the department-store chains of a few decades ago, only Dayton Hudson has adapted well to the modern world, and only because it started an entirely new business, Target. Kodak sold cheap cameras and relied on customers buying lots of expensive film. Just as Gillette makes money on the blades, not the razors.

That model obviously does not work with digital cameras.

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Still, Kodak did eventually build a hefty business out of digital cameras—but it lasted only a few years before camera phones scuppered it. Kodak also failed to read emerging markets correctly. It hoped that the new Chinese middle class would buy lots of film. They did for a short while, but then decided that digital cameras were cooler.

Many leap-frogged from no camera straight to a digital one. Kodak's leadership has been inconsistent. Its strategy changed with each of several new chief executives. The latest, Antonio Perez, who took charge in , has focused on turning the firm into a powerhouse of digital printing something he learnt about at his old firm, Hewlett-Packard, and which Kodak still insists will save it. He has also tried to make money from the firm's huge portfolio of intellectual property—hence the lawsuit against Apple. At Fujifilm, too, technological change sparked an internal power struggle.

At first the men in the consumer-film business, who refused to see the looming crisis, prevailed.

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Named boss incrementally between and , he quickly set about overhauling the firm. He slashed costs and jobs. So we had to reconstruct the business model. This sort of pre-emptive action, even softened with generous payouts, is hardly typical of corporate Japan. Few Japanese managers are prepared to act fast, make big cuts and go on a big acquisition spree, observes Kenichi Ohmae, the father of Japanese management consulting.

For Mr Komori, it meant unwinding the work of his predecessor, who had handpicked him for the job—a big taboo in Japan. Still, Mr Ohmae reckons that Japan Inc's long-term culture, which involves little shareholder pressure for short-term performance and tolerates huge cash holdings, made it easier for Fujifilm to pursue Mr Komori's vision. American shareholders might not have been so patient.

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Surprisingly, Kodak acted like a stereotypical change-resistant Japanese firm, while Fujifilm acted like a flexible American one. Yet he hints that Kodak was complacent, even when its troubles were obvious. The firm was so confident about its marketing and brand that it tried to take the easy way out, says Mr Komori. In the s it tried to buy ready-made businesses, instead of taking the time and expense to develop technologies in-house. Perhaps the challenge was simply too great. Kodak's blunder was not like the time when Digital Equipment Corporation, an American computer-maker, failed to spot the significance of personal computers because its managers were dozing in their comfy chairs.

Dominant firms in other industries have been killed by smaller shocks, he points out. Of the department-store chains of a few decades ago, only Dayton Hudson has adapted well to the modern world, and only because it started an entirely new business, Target.

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And that is what creative destruction can do to a business that has changed only gradually—the shops of today would not look alien to time-travellers from 50 years ago, even if their supply chains have changed beyond recognition. Could Kodak have avoided its current misfortunes? But Canon and Sony were better placed to achieve that, given their superior intellectual property, and neither has succeeded in doing so.

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